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ABSTRACT 
 
Canada’s restrictions on the role of private health insurance for publicly insured 
physician and hospital services are unique among countries with universal, publicly 
funded health care systems. Pressure is mounting in Canada, however, to loosen these 
restrictions and create a parallel system of private finance.  Advocates argue that creation 
of a parallel system of private finance will ensure the sustainability of the public system 
(by reducing public cost pressures), improve access to the public system (e.g., by reducing 
wait times), and improve quality in the public system (through competition).   Opponents 
of parallel private finance argue that it will create “two-tiered” medicine, increase costs, 
compromise equity and reduce quality and access to publicly financed health care as those 
with the financial means (and often the strongest voice) exit to private insurance.   
Australia provides a particularly promising case study for Canada regarding the 
dynamics of parallel systems of public and private finance.    
This paper examines Australia's experience with parallel finance for inpatient hospital 
services to provide insight regarding: (a) the effectiveness of a parallel system of private 
finance in reducing costs and wait times in the public system; (b) risk selection between 
the parallel public and private insurance sectors; (c) the financial redistribution 
associated with the introduction and maintenance of a parallel system of finance; and (d) 
the dynamics of the broader political economy associated with parallel systems of finance.   
Australia's experience provides a number of lessons for Canada, including: (1) the 
potential for cost savings through introduction or expansion of a parallel private sector is 
very limited; (2) the introduction or expansion of a parallel private finance is unlikely to 
reduce wait times in the publicly financed system;  (3) there is no simple way to regulate 
private insurers to pursue public objectives; (4) it is impossible to create an independent, 
isolated parallel system of private finance -- interactions between the public and private 
insurance sectors are complex and unavoidable; (5) quality plays a key role in driving the 
dynamics between the public and privately financed sectors; and (6) it is essential to 
articulate clear policy objectives for health care financing and to design public and 
private roles consistent with these objectives.  Our overall conclusion is that the 
Australian experience provides a cautionary tale regarding the risks, costs and benefits of 




Canada’s restrictions on the role of private health insurance for publicly insured physician and
hospital services are unique among countries with universal, publicly funded health care systems
(Flood and Archibald 2001; Tuohy et al. 2001).   Pressure is mounting in Canada, however, to
loosen these restrictions and create a parallel system of private finance (Senate of Canada 2001;
Gratzen 1999; Orovan 1999; Bliss 1996; Gray 1996).   Advocates for a system of parallel private
finance argue that it will ensure the sustainability of the public system (by reducing public cost
pressures), improve access to the public system (by reducing wait times), and improve quality in
the public system (through competition).  Canadians, they argue, can have greater choice and
higher quality without compromising the fundamental goal of ensuring universal access to needed
health care services.  Opponents of parallel private finance argue that it will create “two-tiered”
medicine, increase costs, compromise equity and reduce quality and access to publicly financed
health care as those with the financial means (and often the strongest voice) exit to private
insurance (e.g., Rachilis 1999; Deber 2000).                                            
Although aspects of this debate are rooted in ideological views largely impervious to
evidence, policy development aspires to be based on evidence regarding the expected effects of
parallel financing.   The development of evidence-based policy in this area, however, is hampered
by the potentially limited generalizability of the experiences of other countries with mixed
systems of finance.  The interactions between parallel public and private insurance sectors are
complex.  They result from strategic behavior by insurers (both public and private), providers and
individuals, which themselves depend crucially on the insurance, tax and regulatory
environments, the organization of the health care system more generally, and the broader political
and governance structures found in a country (Tuohy et al. 2001).1
Australia, however, provides a promising case study for Canada regarding the dynamics of
parallel systems of public and private finance.  Australia is, like Canada, a federation in which
responsibility for health care is split between the federal and state governments.  Its system of
Medicare (introduced in 1984 and modeled in part on Canadian Medicare) combines universal,
public financing for medically necessary physician, hospital and drug services with predominately
private delivery.  Its overall split between public and private finance is also similar to Canada's
(about 70:30).  But, unlike Canada, Australia allows a regulated, parallel system of private finance
for inpatient hospital care.   Indeed, believing that a strong parallel private system of finance will
reduce costs in the public system, increase quality and reduce wait times, Australian federal health
policy makers have since the mid-1990s actively encouraged the parallel private insurance sector
through public subsidies for the purchase of private insurance.  
In this paper we examine Australia's experience with parallel public and private health care 
finance to draw lessons for the Canadian debate on public and private roles in health care
financing.   Our aim is to provide insight into a number of aspects of  parallel private finance,
including: (a) the effectiveness of a parallel system of private finance in reducing costs and wait
times in the public system; (b) risk selection between the parallel public and private insurance
sectors; (c) the financial redistribution associated with the introduction and maintenance of a
parallel system of finance; and (d) the dynamics of the broader political economy associated with
parallel systems of finance.  Our overall conclusion is that the Australian experience provides a
cautionary tale regarding the risks, costs and benefits of a parallel private system of health care
finance.2
2  Australia’s Health Care System
From a health care financing perspective, the current Australian health care system can, like
Canada's, be divided into three parts.  The first part comprises health care services included within
Australian Medicare, its universal, publicly financed health care system to which national
standards apply.   Australian Medicare comprises medical insurance, inpatient hospital insurance,
and pharmaceutical benefits (Donato and Scotton 1998).    The second part includes non-Medicare
health care services for which public financing predominates though no national standards apply. 
Such services include residential long-term care (nursing homes) and home care services.   The
third part includes those services that are predominately privately financed (e.g., non-physician
professional services such as dental care, physiotherapy). 
The Commonwealth (federal) government and state governments share responsibility for
financing and administering the three plans that constitute Medicare.   The Commonwealth
government finances and administers the medical insurance plan and the pharmaceutical benefits
plan, and it shares with state governments in financing hospital-based care.  State governments
administer hospital-based services.  The Commonwealth government enforces national standards
for the state-administered hospital plans through a system of conditional block grants (like
Canadian Medicare). 
The medical insurance plan covers community-based physicians services, which are delivered
predominately by physicians in private practices paid by fee-for-service through a Medicare
Schedule of Benefits (MSB).   Outpatients face two potential types of out-of-pocket expenditure:
the difference between the Medicare reimbursement rate to physicians (85% of the MSB fee) and
the MSB fee; and/or charges related to extra-billing, whereby a physician charges a fee higher1Low-income patients are exempt from user charges.  In addition, general patients face a maximum annual
out-of-pocket expenditure (Aus$280.30 in 2001) beyond which they are exempt from user charges associated with
ambulatory physician services (Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care 2000).  In the mid-1990s,
physicians accepted the MSB fee as payment in full (i.e., patients faced zero out-of-pocket charges) for just over
70% of physician services provided (Donato and Scotton 1998).    
2Unlike the outpatient sector, private insurance can cover the gap between the Medicare payment and
inpatient physician fees.
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than that listed in the MSB.
1   Approximately two-thirds of acute care hospitals are "public" (i.e.,
publicly funded and owned by the State governments or by private not-for-profit religious and
charitable organizations) and employ the physicians who provide care to inpatients.  Australians
distinguish two types of inpatients: (1) public patients, who receive care paid by Medicare in a
public hospital free of charge; (2) private patients, whose care is paid for privately by the patient
or by the patient's private insurance with one exception: even for private patients Medicare covers
inpatient physician services at the rate of 75% of the MSB.
2   The key advantages of being treated
as a private patient in-hospital is choice of inpatient physician (public inpatients are assigned a
staff physician) and quicker access to treatments for which public patients may face a queue.   The
pharmaceutical benefits plan covers the costs of listed prescription drugs obtained on an
outpatient basis through community pharmacies, less a  fixed per-prescription charge (with an
annual maximum out-of-pocket expenditure limit).   Drugs received in hospital by public
inpatients are free and are funded through the hospital budget.
Australia has two types of private health care insurance.  The first, private ancillary
insurance, covers services not publicly insured such as dental care, physiotherapy, and upgrades
from ward accommodation in public hospitals.  Such ancillary insurance in Australia is prohibited
from covering user charges associated with Medicare-insured outpatient physician services and
drugs.  The second is private parallel insurance for inpatient hospital-based services that are also3The premium for a given policy can vary across states and across insurers within a state, and within a state
the premiums can vary across policies.   An insurer cannot, however, charge different premiums to different
individuals in the same state for the same policy. 
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insured by  Medicare.  
Table 1 compares financing approaches in the Australian and Canadian health care systems,
with an emphasis on differences between the two with respect to services included within
Canadian Medicare (i.e., those services subject to the Canada Health Act) and Table 2 provides a
summary of Australian health care expenditures across the sectors and sources of finance. 
3 The Evolution of Health Care Financing Policy in Australia
From the early 1950s through the mid-1970s health care in Australia was primarily privately
financed through a system of subsidized private insurance markets regulated under the 1953
National Health Act.  Australian health care financing policy strove, through regulation and
subsidy, to make private insurance accessible to all Australians (Donato and Scotton 1998).  Two
of the most important regulations in this respect were a common carrier requirement and
community rating of health insurance premiums.  The common carrier regulation required that
insurers accept all applicants within certain membership categories, prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of a person's age, sex, health status, and so forth.   Community-rated premiums required
that the premium charged to an individual not be based on the person's risk status.  Rather, all
Australians who purchased a given insurance policy in a given state were charged the same
premium.
3   Government efforts to increase access to private health insurance also included
subsidies for the private insurance sector (e.g., a per diem subsidy for each day of private hospital
care and subsidies to the reinsurance pool for insurers) and tax deductions for premium payments
by individuals (Owen 1998).4The premium increases were associated with the introduction of coverage for the gap between the
Medicare fee payment to physicians and the physician fees for inpatient physician services.
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Throughout this period Australians actively debated a larger role for public financing.  In
1974, a Labour-party-led federal government introduced a universal public insurance plan
(Medibank).  This lasted less than a year, however, before a newly elected coalition government
ended universality in the public program, though the role of public financing remained above the
pre-Medibank levels. 
The current universal Medicare program for inpatient hospital services, physician services
and prescription drugs was introduced (again by a Labour government) in 1984.  As discussed
above, under Medicare the private insurance sector offers two distinct products: ancillary
insurance for services not covered by Medicare and insurance for inpatient hospital services that
are also covered by Medicare.  The introduction of Medicare, the elimination in 1986 of explicit
subsidies to private hospital care and a large premium increase in the late 1980s
4, however, caused
uptake of private hospital insurance to fall steadily.  By the mid-1990s less than one-third of
Australians held private hospital insurance (compared to 80% in 1974).  
In the mid-1990s the private Australian health insurance sector was in crisis.  In addition to
the fall in uptake of private insurance, the sector appeared to suffer from adverse selection
whereby high-risk Australians were more likely to purchase private insurance than the average
Australian.  During the contraction of the private insurance sector, for example, persons under age
65 were more likely to drop private health insurance (Hall 1999b) and premiums increased at rates
well above the consumer price index (nearly 10% per year between 1989 and 1996 vs 2.9% for
CPI), yet the industry has displayed a remarkable lack of profitability (Industry Commission5  One private insurer advertized as follows:  "If you're healthy, young and single then Bodyguard Young
Singles cover is an excellent hospital and extras package. You save on your premiums because Bodyguard provide
hospital benefits for services that young singles normally require.  By reducing the level of cover on those services
you are unlikely to need in a private hospital we keep your premiums lower"  (See
http://www.nib.com.au/index_about.html -- what day accessed.)
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1997).  Adverse selection commonly occurs when private insurance markets operate alongside
systems of publicly financed care (Shmueli 2001; Ettner 1997; Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000), and
in Australia's case this tendency was thought to be exacerbated by the community-rating
requirement, which prohibited insurers from risk-rating premiums.   Conventional  wisdom in
Australia is that adverse selection was responsible for a premium spiral in the 1990s and that it
posed a considerable threat to the financial viability of the private insurance sector (Hall 1999a;
Industry Commission 1997).   
More recent evidence suggests that adverse selection has not been as severe as initially
thought (Barrett and Conlon 2001), in part because of strategic responses by private insurers
(Vaithianthan 2000b). Vaithianthan (2000b), argues that private insurers averted more severe
adverse selection through strategic plan design that allowed them to separate low- and high-risk
pools, charge different premiums to each, and thereby retain a broader distribution of risk in the
market with premiums that more closely reflected risk status.  Insurers, for example, could
selectively induce older individuals to choose an expensive, comprehensive plan by restricting
joint-replacement (and other services required predominately by the elderly) to such a plan while
crafting less comprehensive plans to appeal to a younger population.    Both marketing practices
of insurers
5 and a comparison of the variety of insurance products offered in the Australian and
New Zealand insurance markets (which does not have community rating) are consistent with such
strategic plan design by insurers (Vaithianathan 2000b).   Unfortunately, while mitigating adverse7
selection, this response also thwarted the public policy objective of community rating.
The election of a conservative Liberal federal government in 1996, which promised to resolve
the crisis in the private insurance sector, growing wait lists and fiscal pressures in the public
system, inaugurated the latest phase in health care financing policy  - a phase designed to expand
the role of private insurance.   This Liberal government believed fervently that a robust parallel
private insurance system was necessary to reduce costs and wait times in the public system.    One
federal health minister commented that:    
“... the health of the publicly funded health sector depends upon a vital private
sector. . . If there were no private sector, the extra costs borne by the taxpayer
would simply be incalculable and the increased demand on public hospitals would
be unsustainable.”  (Federal Minister of Health, Wooldridge (1998)).
It therefore established an Inquiry into the private insurance sector and, on the recommendation of
the Inquiry, it introduced tax incentives in July 1997 to encourage the purchase of private hospital
insurance (The Private Health Insurance Incentives Scheme - 1997 [PHIIS-1997]).   The
incentives included tax rebates of up to $125 per single, $250 per couple, and $450 per family for
low-income households that purchase private health insurance and a tax surcharge of 1 percent of
taxable income for singles earning over $50,000 and families earning over $100,000 who failed to
purchase private health insurance.  
This plan was subsequently replaced by a more extensive system of subsidies and incentives 
embodied in the Private Health Insurance Incentive Act of 1998 (PHIIA-1998).  The PHIIA-1998
included: 
• Insurance Subsidy: a 30% universal rebate (i.e., no income test)
• Tax Penalty: 1% tax surcharge on high earners who do not purchase private hospital
insurance  
• Lifetime Community Rating: after July 1, 2000 a person's premium is to be based on the age8
at which private insurance is first purchased; the inflation-adjusted premium will remain
fixed over a life-time (with the inflation adjustment approved by the Minister of Health).
• No gaps policy: Health insurers were required to provide a full indemnity policy by 2000 to
qualify for the rebate.  The purpose was to reduce the large (and often poorly understood)
cost-sharing in private insurance policies.   
This Act provided a major subsidy to the private health insurance industry -- over $2.0 billion per
year, a sum larger than the combined Australian federal subsidy to the natural resource, mining
and agriculture sectors (Smith 2000).  
4 The Effects of the Subsidies to Private Hospital Insurance
Given the stated objectives for the policies, we examine the effects of the subsidy schemes on: 
expenditures in the public hospital system, wait times in the public hospital system and
redistribution of income.
4.1 The Effect of the Incentive Schemes on Public Sector Costs
Subsidizing private insurance can reduce costs in the publicly financed sector only if three
logically-related conditions hold:  (1) the subsidies increase the uptake of private hospital
insurance; (2) the uptake of private hospital insurance reduces costs in the publicly financed
sector; and (3) the savings associated with (2) exceed the costs of the public subsidies to private
insurance (otherwise, the same monies could be directly invested in the publicly financed system).
4.1.1 The Effect of the Incentive Schemes on the Uptake of Private Insurance in Australia
Evidence suggests that the initial subsidy scheme in effect from July 1, 1997- December 1998
had  little or no effect on the uptake of private health insurance (Figure 1).  The secular decline in
private coverage continued uninterrupted between July 1997 and December 1998, when coverage
reached it lowest level (30.1%).  Starting January 1, 1999 the stronger incentives provided by the
PHIIA-1998 (i.e., the 30% subsidy) reversed the secular decline in coverage but did not lead to a6It is clear that the subsidy alone was not effective.  It is tempting to conclude that the lifetime cover alone
would have been effective, but we can not know as we only observe the lifetime cover offered jointly with the
subsidy.
7Butler (2001) suggests that it could be a short-term phenomenon if it is the result of people dropping out
who purchased private insurance as a result of lifetime community rating but who then missed the first premium
payment.
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large increase in the uptake of private insurance -- private insurance holdings increased from
30.1% of the population in December 1998  to 32.2% in March 2000.   Unquestionably the most
effective component of the PHIIA-1998 for increasing the uptake of private hospital insurance
was the lifetime community rating policy, which is associated with a 40% jump in coverage (from
31% to 43% of the population between January and September 2000).
6   Coverage peaked in the
Fall 2000, however, and the pre-policy downward trend has resumed from this new, higher level
of private coverage.   It is unknown if this decline is a short-term phenomenon and private
holdings will stabilize, or whether this represents the start of adverse selection caused by the still 
considerable cross-subsidization from low- to high-risks even under lifetime community rating
(Butler 2001).
7   The government has also not addressed how it will sustain this policy over the
long run in the face of health care price inflation that drives increases in private insurance
premiums.
4.1.2 The Reduction in Public Hospital Costs Associated with an Increase in Private
Insurance Coverage 
To analyze the potential effect of an increase in insurance coverage on costs in the public
sector, it is helpful to divide the Australian population into three groups:  (1) those who prior to
the incentive scheme purchased private insurance; (2) those who prior to the incentive scheme
chose to self-insure for private care (i.e., pay out-of-pocket for desired private inpatient care); and8They could make changes at the intensive margin by purchasing additional coverage in response to the
subsidies, but such effects are likely to be small.  
9During the 1985/86 - 1995/96 period, overall growth of total private admissions (in public and private
hospitals) was positive during a period of declining private insurance coverage (Hall et al. 1999b).
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(3) those who prior to the incentive scheme relied solely on publicly financed hospital care.   The
behaviour of those in the first group is unchanged by the subsidies,
8 so the cost savings to the
public sector depends on who from groups (2) and (3) is, at the margin, induced to purchase
private insurance by the incentive scheme. 
Vaithianathan (2000a) shows that, under fairly general assumptions, the initial effect of a
public subsidy for private insurance is to induce those who previously self-insured (i.e., paid for 
private services out-of-pocket) to purchase insurance.  Such individuals have a strong taste for
private sector services and the subsidies simply cause them to change from private self-insurance
to private formal insurance.  The uptake of private insurance by these individuals, however, has
little or no effect on costs in the public system because they previously used privately financed
services rather than public services.   Data suggest that the number of people who self-insure in
Australia is large.  Between 8-10% of private hospital admissions in the early 1990s were for
those who self-insured (Hall et al. 1999a, 1999b; Industry Commission 1997).  The exit from
private insurance in recent years was concentrated amongst wealthier families (Barrett and Conlon
2001; Department of Health and Aged Care (undated), many of whom may have been opting out
of formal insurance and into self-insurance.
9  Because those with high-incomes were most likely
to self-insure prior to the incentive schemes, the 1% tax surcharge on high-income earners is
particularly likely to have induced purchases among those who previously self-insured.   The cost-
savings to the public health care system associated with such purchases were further mitigated by10This did in fact occur, so the  policy was changed to require that a high-income household purchase a
low-deductible policy to avoid the tax surcharge.
11The undiscounted longer run savings may be more substantial if such individuals retain their private
coverage as they age.
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the fact that for a high-income earner the tax savings were independent of the amount of private
coverage purchased.  Hence, the rational response by high-income earners would simply be to
purchase a policy with a large deductible that charges a premium less than the 1% tax surcharge
avoided and continue their prior care-seeking behaviours.
10  Hence, it is possible to observe
substantial jumps in private insurance coverage that generate few savings to the public hospital
system.  
Finally, among those in group 3 above who have historically relied solely on the public
system, the most effective element of the 1998 PHIIA for inducing the purchase of private
insurance has been the lifetime cover provision.  The lifetime cover provision provides the
greatest incentive to relatively young individuals to purchase private insurance (the premium for
the remainder of an individual's lifetime is based on the age at which insurance is first purchased). 
The number of persons covered by private hospital insurance, for example, increased by 54.9%
between December 1998 and September 2000, but the percentage increase was 60.7% for those
aged less than 30, 64.3% for those between 30 and 64; and 9.3% for those over age 65 (Health
Insurance Administration Council 2001).  Because the young are, on average, low users of health
care services, in the short run even a substantial increase in the uptake of private insurance among
the young who previously relied solely on the public system may have only a small marginal
effect on costs in the public hospital sector.
11   
4.1.3  Costs of the Subsidies vs Cost Savings to the Public Hospital System12E.g., increased input prices as a result of competition between the private and public sectors for scarce
health care inputs, the Medicare subsidy to private inpatient physician care (for which payments could increase as a
result of greater private insurance coverage), and the subsidy to private patients in public hospitals resulting from
the fact that charges are often less than costs.
12
The incentive schemes will have been effective in reducing pressure on the public system
only if the savings to public-sector expenditures exceed the associated costs.   Ignoring for
simplicity second- and higher-order effects,
12 the costs to the public sector associated with the
PHIIS-1997 and the PHIIA-1998 arise from the subsidy payments, while the savings to the public
purse derive from reduced demand on the public hospital system and new tax revenue from the
1% Medicare surcharge for high-income earners who fail to purchase private insurance.      Butler
(2001) estimates that the costs of the rebates in 1999-00 were nearly $2.3 billion while the
revenue collected from the 1% Medicare surcharge was $110 million, leaving net expenditure of
the incentive scheme of just under $2.2 billion (Table 3).   Treasury Department forecasts that the
expenditures associated with the 30% subsidy will increase while the revenue from the 1% levy
will fall, causing net expenditures on private health insurance subsidies by 2003-04 to exceed $2.3
billion (Butler 2001).  This represents 17.5% of 1998-99 annual current public spending on public
hospitals.  Duckett and Jackson (2000) calculate that, had the tax subsidy been allocated to
spending in the public hospital system, between one-half and two-thirds of all private sector
demand could be met through the public sector.  
Vaithianathan (2000) estimates that, based on the rates of uptake across age groups and the
average hospital utilization by age group, the annual public hospital expenditures potentially
saved by new insurance purchases was AU$800 million.  Segal (2000) similarly concludes that
the cost of the rebates far exceeds any savings to the public hospital system.  The subsidy plan is13
unquestionably not self-financing; on balance, it likely costs the public purse almost $1.5 billion
annually ($2.2 billion net cost less approximately $800m in savings to hospital sector).  
4.2 Effect on Wait Times
One of the motivations for the subsidy to private insurance was long wait times for certain
procedures in the public system.  Analogous to the cost-savings argument discussed above, many
argued that by shifting utilization to the private sector, waiting times would be reduced in the
public system, increasing access for those who must rely on the public system.  National data on
wait lists for services in public hospitals are of variable quality and the most recent data are for
1998-99, just prior to the increase in private insurance coverage identified above (but two years
after the first subsidy scheme was introduced).   The only consistently defined national data series
that spans pre- and post-policy periods pertains to the proportion of patients whose wait time
before admission for an elective procedure exceeded the recommended length given the urgency
of their health condition.   The data indicate virtually no change in this wait time measure between
1995-96 and 1998-99 (the wait exceeded the recommended length for 10.0 percent and 9.9
percent respectively).   At the sub-national level, the State of New South Wales (Australia's
largest state) publishes its own wait list information. A comparison of the average wait times in
October 2000 (just around the time of the increase in private insurance coverage) and November
2001 also suggest no change in wait times (New South Wales Department of Health 2000; New
South Wales Department of Health 2001). 
4.3 Income Redistribution Induced by the Private Insurance Subsidy
Because high-income earners purchase more private health insurance than do those with low
income (Barrett and Conlon 2001; Propper 2000; Besley, Hall and Preston 1999), the subsidy13Smith (2000) also argues that the tax statistics understate the subsidy to private insurers (and the benefits
to high-income earners) because they exclude certain tax expenditures (forgone revenue associated with tax
concessions).
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results in a redistribution from middle- and low-income Australians to high-income Australians. 
Data indicate that for 1997-98 nearly one-half of the tax concessions for private health insurance
went to those in the highest one-third of the income distribution while less than one-fifth of the
subsidies went to those in the lowest one-third of the income distribution (Smith 2000).
13  The
change to a universal rebate scheme which took effect in January 1999 will have caused even
more redistribution to higher income earners. 
5 Lessons for Canada
Australia's experience with parallel insurance for hospital services provides a number of 
lessons for Canada (Table 4) as it wrestles with the difficult issues related to the roles of the
public and private financing in Canadian health care.  In drawing lessons for Canada, we focused
on those aspects of the Australian experience consistent with either predictions drawn from
theory (e.g., economic  models of insurance markets) or experiences in other jurisdictions. 
Hence, we have reason to believe that these findings represent phenomena not unique to
Australia and its institutional arrangements. 
5.1 Lesson 1: The potential for cost savings through introduction or expansion of a parallel
private finance is limited
 Australia's policy of subsidizing private insurance to save costs in the publicly financed
hospital system has been a dramatic failure that, on balance, annually costs the public purse
billons of dollars.  This is consistent with evidence that in the UK subsidies to private insurance
are not self-financing (Emmerson, Frayne and Goodman 2001) and that tax subsidies are a very14It is important to note, however, that the federal government and 9 of 10 provinces currently subsidize
private ancillary health insurance  through the tax system to a value of approximately $1 billion annually (Stabile
2001).   Introducing parallel private insurance without subsidy would therefore require either asymmetric treatment
of the two types of private health insurance or repeal of the existing subsidy (which has previously proved difficult
due to lobbying by the insurance industry).
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expensive way to expand private insurance coverage in the US (Gruber and Levitt 2000).  
Subsidies to private insurance proved expensive in each of the above-noted contexts in part
because they must be paid both to people who already had some form of private insurance
(whose behaviour is little changed) as well as those who newly take up insurance, substantially
raising the cost per new case of coverage.  This is not a concern in the Canadian context, where
parallel private insurance does not currently exist; nor do many of the calls for parallel private
finance in Canada advocate a system of subsidy.
14
A number of factors, however, suggest that the potential for public sector costs savings is
limited even in the absence of subsidies to private insurance.  The central issue concerns the
potential for public cost-savings holding quality constant in the public sector.  Quality plays a
pivotal role in the dynamic between the public and privately financed sectors: if there is little or
no perceived quality difference between the public and private sectors, no economically rational
person would choose private finance in the presence of a free alternative (Besley and Gouveia
1994).  Hence, if quality remains high in the public system, the private parallel system plays at
best a minor role that is unlikely to deliver substantial cost savings to the public system even
under favorable assumptions.  This conclusion is reinforced by the tendency for parallel private
insurers to develop niche markets, offering a limited range of policies that focus on relatively
simple, elective procedures, leaving the expensive cases and those requiring complex,
comprehensive care to the public system.   In the UK, for instance, fewer than two dozen15  The Australian Society of Anaesthetists, for example, says qualified anaesthetists entering the hospital
system can expect a starting salary of $115,000, while those working privately can earn more than $200,000.
(Thursday, July 1, 1999 “Weird Science”  Sydney Morning Herald).
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procedures accounted for over 70% of all private operations in the late 1980s, and the private
insurance policies restricted the conditions covered, in one case, to only 17 specific procedures
(Propper and Maynard 1989). Finally, private insurers frequently impose user charges so that
even those privately insured pay more out-of-pocket for private services than they would if they
accessed publicly financed services, inducing those with private insurance to continue to use the
public system except in those instances where there is a clear advantage to using private services. 
 Together, these considerations suggest that the only scenario under which parallel private
finance leads to substantial cost savings to the public sector is one in which quality in the public
sector is allowed to deteriorate.
The potential for cost savings is further limited by the effect of a parallel private sector on
health care input prices and the financial externalities arising from complementary aspects of the
publicly and privately financed sectors.   The supply of many health care resources (e.g.,
physicians, nurses, technicians) is relatively inelastic in the short run.  The public and private
sectors must compete for these limited resources, and the resulting competition can increase
input prices.  Physicians in the UK can earn 3-4 times more working in the private sector than in
the NHS (Propper and Green 1999).  Anecdotal information suggests considerable differences in
earnings potential in the private and public sectors in Australia.
15   Although the public sector
normally cannot match private sector money wages, it may adjust other aspects of the
compensation contract such as total hours of work or the time allowed to work in the private
sector with no reduction in public-sector salary (Propper and Green 1999).  Adjustments such as16Research on the demand for privately provided services in parallel systems of finance and delivery
consistently find that the vast majority of those who use private services also use public services (Propper 2000).
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these raise the real wage for the public sector even if they leave the published money wage
unchanged.    Such price effects mean that a fixed nominal public sector budget can purchase
fewer real resources and provide fewer services (Chiu 1997).   The net result is that, in the
presence of a parallel private insurance sector, the publicly financed sector must either provide
fewer services or increase funding to maintain the previous real servicing levels.
In addition, health care services offered through the private sector (and covered by private
insurance) are often complements to public sector services.  This is widely observed for
supplemental private insurance policies.  Medigap coverage in the US, for example, increases
Medicare expenditures (Christensen et al. 1987), and those with private drug insurance in
Canada consume 10% more physician visits than those without such in insurance (Stabile 2001). 
In the case of parallel private insurance, a privately financed surgical procedure is often
associated with a variety of related pre- and post-op health care services such as visits, diagnostic
tests, many of which are obtained from the public system.
16  Hence, the private insured services
provided in parallel can often generate costs to the public system.   
5.2 Lesson 2: The introduction or expansion of parallel private finance will not reduce wait
times in the publicly financed system
Although conclusions regarding the effect on wait times of Australia's subsidies to private
insurance are tentative at this time, the evidence of little or no effect on public sector wait times
is consistent with experiences in other jurisdictions (Tuohy et al. 2001).   Both theory and
evidence (e.g., Farnworth 2000; Tuohy et al. 2001) indicate that creating a parallel private sector
can actually increase wait times, especially when providers can work simultaneously in both the18
public and private sectors.   In Canada we have already witnessed this in the nascent private
ophthalmologic sectors in Manitoba and Alberta.   In both provinces, wait lists were substantially
longer for physicians who provided services through both the public system and private clinics
(with an additional "tray" or "facility" fee) than they were for physicians who provided services
only through the public system (DeCoster et al.  2000; Alberta Consumers' Association 1994;
Canadian Health Services Research Foundation 2001).  Globerman and Vining (1998) also cite
examples from New Zealand and South Africa where private sector actions to bid away
physicians and nurses caused temporary shortages in the public sector.
5.3 Lesson 3:  There is no simple way to regulate private insurers to pursue public objectives
It is commonly proposed that private insurers be regulated to mitigate negative effects.  The
recent report of the Canadian Senate Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Science and
Technology, for example, identifies parallel finance as a potential financing option to be pursued
in conjunction with specific regulations designed to limit adverse effects (Senate of Canada
2001).  The strategic responses of Australian private insurers to community rating, however,
illustrates how difficult it can be to regulate in the private interest given the substantial
informational problems in the health care sector (Hurley 2000).   These informational problems
often preclude the design of effective regulatory approaches in the insurance sector that avoid
both unintended negative effects and countervailing responses by insurers.   
5.4 Lesson 4:  The image of an independent, isolated parallel system of private finance is false;
interactions between the public and private insurance sectors are complex and unavoidable
Advocates for parallel private insurance in Canada often propose the creation of a private17To the extent that there might be feedback to the public system, these effects are argued to be wholly
beneficial (e.g., reduced wait times).
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insurance sector independent of the public system -- an innocuous add-on for those who want it.
17 
This vision of "independent parallelism" is false.   Basic economics dictates that there cannot be
an isolated, independent parallel system of finance that does not interact with the public system.   
Even in the absence of explicit subsidies and when providers are prohibited from working in both
the private and public systems, financial and real resource interactions are unavoidable.  Prices
for health care inputs, for example, and the financial externalities associated with use of private
services complementary to publicly financed services inescapably link the private insurance
sector and costs in the public system.  The complex sources of interaction between the privately
financed sector and the publicly financed sector mean that although the two sectors may grow in
parallel, numerous tendrils inevitably entwine them.
5.5 Lesson 5:  Quality plays a key role in driving the dynamics between the public and privately
financed sectors
The introduction of Medicare caused private insurance coverage in Australia to fall; indeed,
even quite large financial subsidies did little to increase private insurance purchases.  Why?  
Overall, Australians rate their publicly financed system quite highly.  In the mid-1990s over 90
percent of those surveyed supported Medicare (Botsman 1999), though there is some suggestion
of reduced confidence by the late 1990s associated with constrained public sector spending
(Donelan et al. 1999).   Unless there is perceived to be a quality difference between the public
and private sectors, no economically rational person would choose private finance in the presence
of a free alternative (Besley and Gouveia 1994).   High levels of satisfaction by Australians (and
the secular decline in private insurance following the introduction of Medicare) suggest that18Quality in health care is difficult to define.  Patient satisfaction may be one part, but it certainly does not
equate with quality as individuals are often do not have requisite knowledge to judge quality.    We emphasize
perceived quality, as that is what is important for individual decision making.
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perceived quality is relatively high, so that maintenance of a large parallel private insurance
sector in Australia requires public subsidy.
18 
The dependence of the parallel private system on a real or perceived difference in quality for
its economic viability raises difficult issues given that most individuals do not have the requisite
information to judge quality in health care (see, e.g., Evans 1984 or Hurley 2000 for a discussion
of the informational problems in the health care sector).   Both providers and private insurers
have incentive to exploit this informational advantage for economic gain by generating real or
perceived differences in quality.  In an individual patient encounter, patients may be in a poor
position to judge provider claims that a privately financed and delivered service is of higher-
quality than that available in the public system.  This has been a recurrent concern, for instance,
for private sector ophthalmologic services in Alberta where some physicians have exaggerated
the differences between publicly insured lenses and privately available lenses (Evans et al. 2000). 
  At the level of public policy, citizens' informational disadvantage makes them less able to
adjudicate claims regarding lower quality in the public system made by those with an interest in
the erosion of the public system.  Given the relative infrequency with which a typical person uses
the hospital system, media can play an important role in shaping public attitudes.   The recent
study of public attitudes toward health care in Manitoba, for example, found that those who had
relied on media reports regarding the functioning of the health care system rated it much worse
than those who had actually used the system within the previous year (Shapiro  et al. 2000). 
Furthermore, this pivotal role of quality and the alignment of private sector economic interests19Six of ten provinces legally prohibit private insurance for publicly insured physician and hospital
services.  A seventh province permits such insurance but does not allow physicians to charge fees greater than the
public plan.  See Flood and Archibald (2001) for details. 
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means erosion of quality in the public sector may not arise simply from a passive loss of "voice"
as better off, better-connected and more vocal citizens exit to the private system; rather, a more
active process is possible that serves private interests (Hirshman 1970).
5.6 Lesson 6:  It is essential to articulate clearly the policy objectives set for health care
financing and design public and private roles consistent with these objectives. 
The need to articulate clearly policy objectives and to design public and private roles consistent
with these objectives may seem so banal that it does not merit discussion.   But obfuscation of
policy objectives is widespread, is at times deliberate and strategic because it serves certain
stakeholders, and is the source of much trouble (Stone 2001).   Australia's Industry Commission
(1997), for example, observed that until Australians resolve whether private insurance is intended
primarily to be a complement to or a substitute for Medicare it will be impossible to develop
coherent health care financing policies.  This confusion has generated a set of mutually
incompatible financing policies in Australia whose objectives cannot simultaneously be met.  
Canadian Medicare appears thus far to have avoided such a confusion of objectives.  Private
health insurance since the middle 1960s, and especially since the 1984 Canada Health Act (CHA),
has been limited to a complementary role providing ancillary coverage for services not included
within Medicare.   Canadian policy has effectively prohibited parallel private insurance for those
services included in Medicare.
19  So why is Australia's experience pertinent to Canadians? 
Because the fact that Canada has maintained a clear vision for its Medicare system since its
inception does not guarantee that it will do so in the future.20We emphasize explicit because in fact there is nearly always some form of cross-subsidization from
public to private insurers.
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The alternative visions for public and private roles that have animated the Australian debate
in the last two decades also compete for dominance in the Canadian debate, and there is always
pressure to shift among these visions, particularly once strong private sector interests become
established.    One vision, which reflects the current arrangement in Canada for CHA-covered
services, limits private insurance to ancillary services not included in Medicare and which are not
central to the goal of providing universal access to medically necessary health care.  The policy
interest in private insurance under this vision is limited to regulatory policies to ensure good
practice in the complementary private insurance sector (i.e., no fraud, adequate reserves, etc.).  A
second vision would allow private insurance for publicly insured services, with no explicit subsidy
to such parallel insurance.
20   Parallel private insurance is to be tolerated and regulated but not
encouraged.  Parallel private insurance responds to those with particular tastes (and incomes) and
serves as a safety valve.  This vision corresponds roughly with the immediate post-Medicare
period in Australia, in which parallel insurance was allowed but explicit subsidies to such
insurance (and private care) were reduced or removed.    Finally, a third vision sees parallel
private insurance as an alternative to (or substitute for), public insurance.  This vision requires
policies to create broad access to private insurance so that everyone has the option to choose
between obtaining services through Medicare or through the private sector.  The language of
Australia's ruling conservative federal government in the 1990s has at times reflected this vision.  
In Canadian debates, this vision is perhaps reflected best by calls for medical savings accounts and
related financing mechanisms (e.g., Premier's Advisory Council on Health for Albertans 2001;23
Senate of Canada 2001; Coffey and Chaoulli 2001; Gratzen 1999; Ramsey 1998).   
Although post-war Australian health care policy  represents an extreme case of alternating
among these competing visions, every jurisdiction experiences pressures to shift among them. 
Maintaining equilibrium in the middle ground of "tolerate but do not subsidize" private insurance
may be particularly difficult (Evans 2000).   Interest group political theory argues that there will
be continual pressure to introduce or expand subsidy to the private sector.   Private health insurers
and health care providers (particularly physicians) and health care suppliers (e.g., pharmaceutical
companies) are well-resourced, well-connected, and have a concentrated interest in health policy
that contrasts starkly to the diffuse interests of the general population (Stone 2001).    In this
setting, both provider and private insurance interests align to push for expansion and subsidy to
private insurance, especially when the public sector is effective in exercising cost control.    The
UK, for instance, has shifted back and forth in providing explicit subsidy to its parallel private
health insurance sector (Emmerson, Frayne and Goodman 2000).  Closer to home, we see this
general dynamic in sectors outside health care, such as in the education sector in Ontario where
the government has recently proposed tax credits for parents who send their children to private
schools instead of the universal public system (Smith 2001).  
Maintaining clear objectives and assessing fit between objectives and policy is vital also
because a series of individually small changes, each of which does not obviously compromise
major objectives, can add up to large effects that contradict stated objectives.   Recent changes in
the rehabilitation sector in Ontario exemplify this dynamic.  In the mid-1980s rehabilitation
services were predominately publicly financed as an integral part of the publicly financed health
care system. Within a decade, however, outpatient rehabilitation services had become almostentirely privatized, largely without public discussion or awareness (Gildiner 2001).  The change
was not ideologically driven -- it occurred under three ideologically different administrations
(Liberal, NDP, Conservative).  Nor was it primarily driven by public-sector fiscal constraints --
much of the change predated the fiscal retrenchment of the early and mid-1990s.    Rather it was
rooted in a series of policy decisions related to workers' compensation and automobile casualty
insurance that set in place a self-perpetuating dynamic of gradual detachment of outpatient
rehabilitation from the public system and growing attachment with priorities and needs of
workers' compensation and the casualty insurance sector, and with growing private sector interests
in both delivery and financing that attracted new, larger and more powerful private sector
stakeholders. 
6 Conclusions
Australia's experience with parallel systems of public and private finance provides a cautionary tale
for Canadians.  Cautions arise particularly when Australia's experience is placed in the context of
evidence from other jurisdictions regarding the dynamics of insurance markets and system of
health care financing.  Effects observed in Australia are consistent with broader international
experience, which provides little evidence to support the claim that introducing a parallel system of
private insurance in Canada would decrease wait times, improve quality, or reduce costs in the
publicly financed system.  Australia's experience illustrates how difficult it can be to regulate
private insurance to prevent adverse effects in each of these dimensions of the performance of the
publicly financed system.  The evidence suggests that the introduction of a parallel system of
finance would redistribute income (in general, from sick, low-income individuals to healthy, high
income individuals, and from members of society more generally to health care providers and
insurers), increase inequality in access to health care, and increase choice for those who can afford25
private insurance.  
In summary, experience in Australia and elsewhere, consistent with much health economic
analysis, fails to support the claim that parallel public and private finance will advance commonly
stated objectives for Canada's health care financing policy: improving access to care, ensuring
access is based on need, improving population health, and increasing system efficiency and equity.
This would appear to leave only two possible arguments in support of parallel private
insurance.  The first is the rights-based argument that every individual has the right to purchase
health care on whatever terms are acceptable to them, and that the primary obligation of our society
is to protect and respect this right, irrespective of the negative consequences of enforcing this right
(Hurley 2001).   The Canadian public and policy makers to date have not shown much sympathy
for this libertarian-style argument (Giacomini et al. 2001). 
A second possible line of argument emphasizes the importance of responding the diverse
preferences among members of society for differing levels of health care insurance (Hurley 2001). 
Under a single-payer public insurance system, everyone consumes the same amount of health
insurance.  If there is great diversity across members of society in preferences for health insurance,
and society places great importance on responding to diverse preferences, a parallel system of
private finance could potentially improve welfare over a single-payer system if the benefits of
responding to diverse preferences exceed the welfare losses associated with the above-documented
negative effects of parallel private finance.   We have no hard data on the diversity of Canadian
preferences for health insurance, though the historical high levels of satisfaction with the health
care system suggest no deep-seated, broadly based frustration with the single-payer system. 
Canadian society has not historically placed great importance on responding to diverse preferences;26
certainly relative to the U.S., in Canada the collective has received more weight than the individual
(Lipset 1990).  
Whether Canadians will find either of these arguments persuasive remains to be seen.  Polling
evidence indicates that Canadians continue to support strongly the principles embodied in the
Canada Health Act, but are worried about the health care system (Conference Board of Canada
2000).  What remains vitally important is clearly articulating the goals of our health care financing
policies, assessing the evidence of how alternative financing arrangement serve to advance (or
detract from) these goals, and conveying to Canadians the real options and their related effects.27
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Table 1: Summary of Canadian and Australian Health Care Systems                                         
SERVICE AUSTRALIA CANADA     
CHA, Publicly Insured Services
Community-based Physician
Services 
- private insurance coverage not legal
- physician fees unregulated
- extra-billing permitted
- individuals liable for out-of-pocket payments for:
a. 15% gap between listed Medicare fee and reimbursement to
MD paid by Medicare 
b. MD charges above Medicare fee 
- private insurance coverage illegal/severely restricted
- physician must accept public fee as payment in full
- extra-billing illegal
- individuals face no out-of-pocket costs for CHA mandated
community-based physician services






     Physician Services - no choice of MD
- MD services free




















- choice of MD
- physician must accept public fee as payment in full
- extra-billing illegal
- private insurance coverage not legal
- individuals face no out-of-pocket costs  inpatient physician
services
     Drugs - free of charge -  patient liable
for all costs;
priv ins legal
- patient  liable
for all costs;
priv ins legal
- free of charge
     Other health care services - free of charge - patient liable
for all charges
- priv ins legal 
- patient liable
for all charges
- priv ins legal
- free of charge
     Hotel and related services - basic services
free of charge




- priv ins legal 
- patient liable
for all charges
- priv ins legal 
- basic services free of charge
- patient can purchase upgrades (e.g., semi-private room)
- private insurance coverage for upgrades legal34
Non-CHA Services                     Australia                Canada
    Outpatient Prescription
Drugs
-       universal coverage as part of Medicare
- financed by Commonwealth
- beneficiary co-payments 
- private insurance to cover co-payments prohibited  
- not included in Canadian Medicare
- provincially based plans for defined populations, with co-
payments
- private insurance coverage legal for individuals not covered
by provincial plans; coverage often benefit of employment
- although not prohibited, little if any private insurance to
cover copayments required in provincial plans 
   Residential Long-Term Care  - not included in Australian Medicare
- administered by states; joint Commonwealth/state financing
- public financing constitutes about three-quarters of expenditures
- private insurance allowed but not common 
- not included in Canadian Medicare
- public financing constitutes about three-quarters of
expenditures
- private insurance allowed but not common  
      Home Care - not included in Australian Medicare
- administered by states with joint Commonwealth/state financing
- public financing constitutes about three-quarters of expenditures
- private insurance allowed but not common 
- not included in Canadian Medicare
- private insurance allowed but not common35
Table 2: Recurrent Health Expenditures
1 in Australia by Source and Sector, 1998-99  ($ million-Aus)
                                  Public                                                      Private  Total Recurrent
Commonwealth State and
Local
    Total
   Public
  Private        
 Insurance
    Individual
 Out-of-Pocket        Other
7
      Total
     Private
   
Hospital
   Public
   Private
        7,101 
   
       6,598
          503
       6,516 
       6,516
          --
13,617  (75.5%)
2
13,113  (93.2%)  
     503   (12.7%)
    2,738
       289
    2,524
        739
        297
        367      
        938
        374









  3,959   (8.3%)
Professional Services
  Physician Services  












   505 (12.1%)








    Prescription   




         --
         --
         --
    3,086 (53.0%)
    3,086 (83.7%)
           --
       36
        --
       36
       2,697
        601
      2,096  
         --
         --
         --
 2,733 (47.0%)
    601 (16.3%)
2,132   (100%)
   5,819 (12.3%)
  3,687    (7.8%)
  2,132    (7.8%)
Nursing Homes     3011 244   3,255 (80.1%)  -- 789 22 811 (19.9%) 4066   (8.6%)
Other


















Source:  Australia Institute of Health and Welfare, (2001b), Table A10.
Notes to Table 2:
1. Recurrent expenditures excludes capital outlays and tax expenditures.
2. The percentage is the proportion of expenditures in the relevant health care sector financed through public (private) sector.
3. The percentage is the proportion of total expenditures accounted for by the relevant health care sector.
4. The percentage is the proportion of total expenditures accounted for by the relevant source of finance.
5. Includes dental services, chiropractic, etc.
6. "Other" includes ambulance services, aids and appliances, community and public health, administration, and research.
7. Includes workers compensation and automobile insurance payments. 36
Table 3: Subsidies to Private Health Insurance in Australia, 1997-98 to 1999-00 
(all figures are $million at nominal prices)
1997-98 1998-99 1999-00
Subsidies Provided
PHIIS - 1997 411.6 188.2 -
PHIIA - 1998 (30% Rebate) - 1278.3 2306.9
Revenue for 1% Tax Surcharge 105 140 110
Net Cost of Incentive Scheme 306.6 1326.5 2196.9
Source: Adapted from Butler (2001)37
Table 4:  Lessons for Canada from Australia's Experience with Parallel Finance
1. The potential for cost savings through introduction or expansion of a parallel private sector is
limited.
2. The introduction or expansion of a parallel private finance will not reduce wait times in the
publicly financed system.
3. There is no simple way to regulate private insurers to pursue public objectives.
4. Quality play a key role in driving the dynamics between the public and privately financed sectors.
5. The image of an independent, isolated parallel system of private finance is false; interactions
between the public and private insurance sectors are complex and unavoidable.
6. It is essential to articulate clearly the policy objectives set for health care financing and design
public and private roles consistent with these objectives.38
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A:  Private Health Insurance Incentives Act 1997 ("carrots & sticks" scheme)
B:  Private Health Insurance Incentives Act 1998 (30% rebate)
C:  National Health Amendment (Lifetime Health Cover) Act 1999 (lifetime community rating)
C2
(C1 = announcement date;  C2 = implementation date)
Source: Butler (2001).